CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONFESSIONS-WAIVER

OF PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION HELD INVALID DUE TO POLICE
FAILURE TO INFORM SUSPECT OF ATTORNEY'S ATTEMPT TO CON-

TACT HiM-State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993).
Arguably the most fundamental purpose of the American judicial system is to determine the guilt or innocence of a person accused of committing a crime.' One would expect that a full
confession 2 from the accused would be irrefutable proof of that
person's guilt.- This is not always true, however, because some con1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966) (noting that the prosecution of
individuals for crime goes to the core of American jurisprudence).
2 In defining "confession," Wigmore noted that two views exist. 3 JOHN H. WicMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRILms AT COMMON LAw § 821, at 308 (James H. Chadbourn ed.,
rev. vol. 1970). The early view defined confession as "an acknowledgment in express
words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some
essentialpartof it" Id. The modern view holds that although admissions and allegedly
exculpatory statements are not truly "confessions" as defined by the early view, they
should nevertheless be treated as confessions for the purpose of implicating exclusionary rules which restrict the admissibility of confessions. Id. at 326; see also BLACK'S
LAw DicrIONARY 296 (6th ed. 1990) (defining confession as "[a] voluntary statement
made by a person charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, communicated to another person, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act or the share and
participation which he had in it."). According to Black's, a confession is distinguished
from an "admission" in that a confession admits or acknowledges all of the facts required for conviction of a crime, while an admission is an acknowledgement of facts
tending to establish guilt which falls short of acknowledging all of the essential elements of a crime. Id. at 297. Similarly, an "inculpatory statement" is a statement
which tends to establish guilt or otherwise incriminate the speaker, while falling short
of completely admitting to the commission of the crime. Id. at 768. Alternatively, an
"exculpatory statement" is one which tends to absolve, clear, or excuse a suspect from
alleged wrongdoing or guilt. Id. at 566.
In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the United States Supreme Court indicated that due process analysis does not meaningfully distinguish between coerced confessions and coerced admissions. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274, 276, 278-79 (1946).
Moreover, in Miranda v. Arizona, the Court stated that "[n]o distinction can be drawn
between statements which are direct confessions and statements which amount to
'admissions' of part or all of an offense." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The Miranda
Court further professed that "no distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.'" Id. at 477. Accordingly,
confessions, admissions, and allegedly exculpatory statements will be treated as synonymous for the purpose of this Note.
3 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596 (1896) (observing that suspects' free and
voluntary admissions or confessions have always ranked high on the scale of inculpating evidence); see also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884) (noting that a free
and voluntary confession is evidence of the "most satisfactory character[,]" and that a
deliberate, voluntary confession is one of the most effective proofs in the law); 3 SiR
WiLLIAM 0. RUSSELL, KNT., A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 365 (Charles S.
Greaves ed., vol. 1865) (declaring "[a] free and voluntary confession of guilt made by a
prisoner... is admissible in evidence as the highest and most satisfactory proof, bestrIq
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fessions are inaccurate or made involuntarily. 4 For example, a suspect may be tortured, tricked, or coerced into giving a false
confession. 5 The courts therefore have had to develop a body of
law to ensure that only honest and trustworthy confessions are considered in determining a suspect's guilt or innocence. 6
One rule promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in
this area of law is that a suspect must be advised of certain constitutional rights prior to being questioned by police.7 The right
cause it is fairly presumed that no man would make such a confession against himself
if the facts confessed were not true.").
4 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446 (examining various techniques used by police to
obtain involuntary confessions); see also Dr. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False
Confessions, 57 THE MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 93 (1989) [hereinafter Gudjonsson, Psychology];
Dr. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions, 142 NEw L.J. 1277 (1992)
[hereinafter Gudjonsson, False Confessions]. Dr. Gudjonsson, an authority on suggestibility under interrogation, concluded that people undoubtedly confess to crimes that
they did not commit. Gudjonsson, Psychology, supra, at 93-94. Dr. Gudjonsson discovered that there is no single reason why individuals falsely confess to crimes, and that
false confessions usually result from a combination of factors. Gudjonsson, False Confessions, supra,at 1277. Most often, Dr. Gudjonsson related, false confessions occur in
cases of alleged murder and serious sex offenses. Gudjonsson, Psychology, supra, at 95.
Dr. Gudjonsson found that false confessors are generally under a great deal of stress
resulting from their arrest and subsequent interrogation, and they focus on the immediate, desirable consequences of confessing (e.g. an end to the interrogation) rather
than the negative, long term consequences (conviction and incarceration for a crime
they did not commit). Id. at 97, 101. False confessions also result, the author learned,
when suspects begin to accept suggestions offered by police (e.g. "Well, it looks like I
did it"; "If the polygraph says that I did it I must have done it[.]") Id. at 102. Dr.
Gudjonsson also determined that, as a group, alleged false confessors have a significandy lower I.Q. and are noticeably more suggestible and compliant than confessors
as a whole. Id. at 106. Another study, the author noted, found that low intelligence,
psychological disturbance, poor literacy, suggestibility, and low mental age were factors that led to false confessions. Id. at 100.
5 Miranda,384 U.S. at 446, 453. For an example of a suspect being tortured into
giving a false confession, see Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 8-13 (1924)
(police interrogate and physically torment a sick and feeble murder suspect for
eleven days to extract a confession). For other examples of suspects incriminating
themselves as a result of police torture, trickery, or coercion, see Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1980) (police coax a robbery suspect into revealing the location
of a sawed-off shotgun by emphasizing the importance of recovering the weapon
before it could be found by a handicapped child from a nearby school); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977) (police induce a murder suspect into revealing
the location of the victim's body by stressing the importance of finding the body
quickly so that the victim. could receive a proper Christian burial); Watts v. Indiana,
338 U.S. 49, 52-53 (1949) (police obtain a confession by depriving the suspect of food
or sleep, interrogating him night and day for five days, and secluding him in a cell
known as "the hole").
6 See generally Miranda,384 U.S. at 458-66 (discussing the evolution of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the United States).
7 Id. at 444. Specifically, Miranda requires police, prior to any questioning, to
inform a suspect that "he has a fight to remain silent, that any statement he does
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against compelled self-incrimination,' which allows a suspect to remain silent and to refuse to answer questions, is one of the most
important constitutional rights possessed by a suspect.' Only if the
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
8 The "right against compelled self-incrimination" stems from certain provisions
contained in both the United States Constitution as well as many state constitutions.
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 645 (1993). These provisions prohibit the government
from forcing a suspect to be a witness or give evidence against himself. Id. Further,
any incriminating evidence that a suspect is compelled to provide in violation of this
right is inadmissible against the suspect in court. Id.
9 See generally, Miranda,384 U.S. at 442, 457-58. In Miranda, ChiefJustice Warren
described the right against self-incrimination as "one of our Nation's most cherished
principles[,]" and emphasized that this "precious" right was secured in the Constitution only after hundreds of years of struggle and persecution. Id. At early common
law, courts placed no restrictions on the admissibility of confessions and accepted all
self-incriminating statements into evidence. WIGMoRE, supra note 2, at § 818 (noting
that confessions were admitted during the 1500s and 1600s "without question as to
their proceeding from hope of promises or from fear of threats, even of torture.").
See also Note, Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REV. 935, 954 (1966)
(reporting that all confessions, including those which had been obtained through the
use of torture, were admissible at early common law). But see R.H. Helmholz, Origins
of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: The Role of the European lus Commune, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 967 (1990) (professing that the ancient English common law tenet
forbidding compelled self-incrimination appeared as early as the year 1234). In the
late 17 00s, courts began to question the practice of admitting all confessions into
evidence and recognized that certain self-incriminatory statements should be excluded as untrustworthy. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 819 (declaring that Lord Mansfield made the first judicial declaration restricting the admissibility of confessions in
1775 in The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160-61 (K.B. 1775)). See also George E. Dix,
Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH.
U. L.Q. 275, 279-80 (1975) [hereinafter Dix, Modern Confessions] (stating that confessions made under promises and threats were inadmissible in early English practice);
and WAYNE R. LAFAvE AND JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 294 (2d
ed. 1992) (noting that English trial judges began imposing restrictions on the admission of confessions during the mid-eighteenth century). By the mid-1800s, the principle of exclusion was fully developed, and judges would eagerly reject confessions and
incriminatory statements obtained under circumstances that suggested that the statements were not made voluntarily. WIGMORE, supra note 2, at § 820. See also Kevin
Urick, The Right Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination in Early American Law, 20 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REv. 107, 115 (1988) (examining the broad scope of the right against
self-incrimination in America from the late 1700s to the late 1800s). Today, the right
against self-incrimination is expressly secured by the Fifth Amendment, which states,
"No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]" U.S. CONsr. amend. V.
In addition to the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, a suspect possesses the right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation.
Miranda,384 U.S. at 469. The right to counsel in this context, however, does not stem
from the Sixth Amendment's express conferral of that right. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). Instead, the right to the presence of counsel
during custodial interrogation emanates from the Fifth Amendment. See James J.
Tomkovicz, Standardsfor Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA
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suspect is advised of and validly waives this right may a confession
be used against him in court. 10
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled on the validity
of a suspect's waiver of rights and the admissibility of the suspect's
subsequent confession in State v. Reed." In Reed, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that when police fail to inform a suspect of an
attorney's attempts to contact him, any subsequent waiver of the
privilege against self-incrimination by the suspect will be deemed
invalid. 2 The Reed court further declared that any confession obtained under such circumstances will be inadmissible against the
3
suspect in court.1

On March 16, 1987, police asked John Reed to come to the
Somerset County Prosecutor's Office for questioning about the
murder of Susan Green. 4 Reed and his girlfriend, Fran Varga,
L. REv. 975, 976 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court has identified an implicit
entitlement to assistance of counsel in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against selfincrimination). Although the Fifth Amendment does not expressly guarantee a right
to counsel, the Court has held that the right to have an attorney present during interrogation is "indispensable" to protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. Thus, the right to have an attorney present during
interrogation is an indispensable conjunct of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. Id. at 471. For further discussion of the rights to counsel guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, see infra note 71 and accompanying text.
10 Miranda,384 U.S. at 444, 476. In Miranda,ChiefJustice Warren declared that a
defendant may waive his right against self-incrimination, provided that the waiver is
made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444. The Miranda Court further provided that unless the prosecution established at trial that a defendant was
advised of and waived his rights, no evidence obtained from the interrogation could
be used against him. Id. at 479.
11 133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993).
12 Id. at 261-62, 627 A.2d at 643.
13 Id. at 269, 627 A.2d at 647.
14 Id. at 240, 627 A.2d at 632. At 8:00 a.m. on Monday, March 16th, the Franklin
Township Police received a phone call from Fran Varga, Reed's girlfriend and roommate. Id. Varga informed the police that Reed had discovered the dead body of his
co-worker, Susan Green, in Green's apartment. Id. Upon their arrival at Green's
apartment, police found the door unlocked and Green's body on the living room
floor. Id. Green's pants and underwear had been forced down to her knees, and she
had been stabbed fifty-three times in the heart, liver, lungs and abdomen. Id.
Green's skull had also been fractured by a strong blow to the head. Id. The police
asked Reed and Varga to meet them at the apartment. Id. Upon the couple's arrival,
police questioned Reed for a short time, and then allowed him to leave. Id. When
questioned about his knowledge of the murder, Reed told police that Green called
him on Friday, March 13th, terrified because some "black man" was pounding on the
window. Id. at 242, 627 A.2d at 632. Reed alleged that he immediately went to
Green's apartment and searched the area. Id. Unable to find anyone outside, Reed
spoke with Green for a short time and then departed. Id. Reed returned to Green's
apartment for a dinner engagement at 5:00 p.m. the next day, but went home after
Green failed to answer the door. Id. Reed was unable to contact Green on Sunday, so
he stopped at her apartment on Monday morning before going to work. Id., 627 A.2d
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drove to the office where they were separated by police immediately upon their arrival. 5 While police transferred Reed into an
interrogation room for questioning, Varga contacted attorney William Aitken from a phone in the office lobby.16 Without Varga's
knowledge, the police then moved Reed to Major Crimes, a satellite office located a few miles away. 1 7 Shortly after the police transferred Reed, Aitken arrived at the Prosecutor's Office and asked to
speak with Reed. 18 An Assistant Prosecutor denied this request, informing Aitken that Reed was not a suspect, but merely a witness,
and that Aitken had no right to interfere with an investigation.' 9
The Assistant Prosecutor assured Aitken that police would contact
at 633. Reed found the door unlocked and went inside. Id. After discovering
Green's body, he immediately called Varga. Id.
After Reed gave this statement to the police, he returned home, Id. at 240, 627
A.2d at 632. Shortly thereafter, Franklin Police Detectives Nicholas Importico and
Clark Shedden arrived at Reed's home and asked him to come to the station for
additional questioning. Id. at 240-41, 627 A.2d at 632. Because Reed was extremely
nervous, Varga offered to drive Reed to the Prosecutor's Office. Id. at 241, 627 A.2d
at 632. Additionally, Varga claimed that she went to the Prosecutor's Office in order
to help the police understand Reed, who stuttered uncontrollably when nervous and
had a severe speech impediment attributable to a hare lip and cleft palate. Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. Varga testified that as soon as Reed was taken in to be interrogated, she
telephoned her aunt, who told her to call attorney Peter Lanfrit. Id. Upon receiving
her call, Lanfrit told Varga that he would send an associate, William Aitken, to the
Prosecutor's Office at once. Id. Lanfrit then instructed Aitken to go to the office and
determine whether to represent Reed, Varga, or both. Id. Varga claimed that she
asked police not to question Reed further until his attorney arrived, and that the
officer she spoke with nodded in affirmation. Id.
17 Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court highlighted the peculiar manner in which
the police moved Reed to Major Crimes. Id. Instead of exiting the office by way of
elevator, which would have required Importico and Shedden to take Reed through
the lobby and past Varga, the officers took Reed down four flights of stairs and out
the back door of the building. Id. The officers later testified that they had taken the
stairs with no intention of avoiding Varga, but that it was simply more convenient to
use the stairs to exit the building. Id.
The Somerset County Prosecutor's Office disputes the New Jersey Supreme
Court's version of these events. Jeff May, Judge Rejects Plea to Bar Prosecutor,THE COURIER-NEws, Oct. 9, 1993, at A5. The Prosecutor's Office contends that Reed had actually been out of the office for a half-hour before Varga and Aitken arrived, and that
"[t]he Supreme Court ... is simply wrong on the facts." Id.
18 Reed, 133 N.J. at 242, 627 A.2d at 633.
19 Id. at 242-43, 627 A.2d at 633. It is unclear whether the Assistant Prosecutor
notified the interrogating officers of Aitken's request. Id. at 243, 627 A.2d at 633.
Shedden, who questioned Reed at Major Crimes, testified that he was not aware that
an attorney had been retained for Reed, but he did know that an attorney was in the
office to represent Varga. Id. The Assistant Prosecutor did not testify during the pretrial hearing because he represented the State in Reed's initial trial. Id. Therefore,
the record does not reveal whether the Assistant Prosecutor notified Shedden that
Aitken wished to speak with Reed. Id. It is undisputed, however, that no one informed Reed of Aitken's attempt to speak with him. Id.
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him if and when Reed requested a lawyer. 20 No one, however, informed Reed that an attorney was present and wished to speak with
him.
In the meantime, the police and Reed arrived at Major
Crimes. 22 Shortly thereafter, the police advised Reed of his Miranda rights for the first time. 2' Reed waived these rights24 and
denied killing Green, but police remained skeptical 25 and asked
Reed to take a polygraph test. 26 Reed initially agreed to submit to
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241-42, 627 A.2d at 632.
Id. at 242, 627 A.2d at 633. In Miranda,the United States Supreme Court held
that before interrogation may begin, police must advise a suspect that "he has the
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
24 The MirandaCourt provided that after police have issued the Miranda warnings,
the suspect may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and agree to make a statement or answer questions. Miranda,384 U.S. at 479. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing specific waiver provisions contained in Miranda).
In addition to verbally acknowledging that he understood his Miranda rights,
Reed signed a Miranda waiver card. Reed, 133 NJ. at 242, 627 A.2d at 633. A Miranda
waiver card is a card or form which asks questions or contains statements about the
Miranda warnings. State v. Reed, 249 NJ. Super. 41, 45, 592 A.2d 4, 6 (1991), overruled, 133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993). The questions are designed to evoke responses which demonstrate that a defendant understands his Miranda rights. Id.
Although the cards used by individual police departments vary, a typical Miranda
waiver form provides the following warnings:
(1) You have the right to remain silent. (2) Anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. (3) You have the right to a
lawyer and have him present with you while you are being questioned.
(4) If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before any questioning, if you wish. (5) You can decide at any
time to exercise these rights and not answer any questions or make any
statements. (6) Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you? (7) Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to
us now?
Miranda Warning (1991) (Somerset County Prosecutor's Office Miranda Waiver
Form). Police either read these warnings to the suspect or have the suspect himself
read them aloud, and then ask the suspect to initial each of the warnings. Interview
with James L. McConnell, Somerset County Assistant Prosecutor, in Somerville, N.J.
(Sept. 29, 1993). Police next ask the suspect to sign the following statement: "l,
have been read and understand my rights as written above." Id. (quoting Miranda Warning, supra). Lastly, witnessing officers sign and date the form. Id.
25 Reed's denial contained inconsistencies from the version of events he originally
gave police at Green's apartment. Reed, 133 N.J. at 242, 627 A.2d at 633. Most significantly, at the station, Reed stated that on the morning he found Green's body, he
covered it with a pillow and jacket, and then went to work. Id. See supra note 14
(reporting that Reed initially told police that he phoned Varga immediately after discovering Green's body).
26 Id. at 242-43, 627 A.2d at 633. A polygraph, more commonly known as a "lie
detector," is an "electro-mechanical instrument used to determine whether an ex20
21
22
23
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the polygraph; however, after he was advised of and waived his Miranda rights for a second time, Reed changed his mind and refused to take the test.2 7 Police resumed questioning,2 8 and
eventually Reed admitted to murdering Green.2 9 Reed was advised
of and waived his Miranda rights for the third time, and then gave
the police a full, taped confession.30
aminee is truthfully answering questions. It simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body which it is believed are involuntarily
caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to deceive an interrogator." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1160 (6th ed. 1990) (citation omitted). See generally ANTHONY GALE, THE
POLYGRAPH TEsr (1988) (discussing the polygraph test and its application in legal
practice); JOHN E. REID AND FRED E. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION: THE POLYGRAPH
("LiE-DETEcTOR")

TECHNIQUE

(2d ed. 1977) (outlining testing procedures and review-

ing admissibility).
27 Reed, 133 N.J. at 242-44, 627 A.2d at 633.
28 Id. at 244, 627 A.2d at 633-34. After Reed refused to take the polygraph, his
interrogators utilized the "good cop-bad cop" routine to extract his confession. Id.
This well-known and highly effective method of interrogation was dubbed the
"'friendly-unfriendly'" or "'Mutt and Jeff' act" by Chief Justice Warren in Miranda.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 452. The Miranda Court described the technique as follows:
In this technique, two agents are employed. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who knows the subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time.
He's sent a dozen men away for this crime and he's going to send the
subject away for the full term. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a
kindhearted man. He has a family himself. He has a brother who was
involved in a little scrape like this. He disapproves of Mutt and his tactics and will arrange to get him off the case if the subject will cooperate.
He can't hold Mutt off for very long. The subject would be wise to make
a quick decision. The technique is applied by having both investigators
present while Mutt acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the room.
Id. (quotation omitted).
In Reed, Somerset County Chief of Detectives Richard Thornburg assumed the
role of the "bad cop," yelling at Reed and accusing him of murdering Green because
she refused to have sex with him. Reed, 133 N.J. at 244, 627 A.2d at 634. Thornburg
told Reed that he was "'nothing more than an animal[,]'" and then said that he was
leaving to file a homicide complaint. Id. Detective Shedden, on the other hand,
played the "good cop." Id. Shedden was empathetic, and related to Reed that "'he
could understand how maybe [Green] could have had this coming to her."' Id. Reed
then confessed to the murder. Id.
29 Reed, 133 N.J. at 244, 627 A.2d at 634.
30 Id. In his final account of the murder, Reed claimed that he was upset because
Varga had left for the weekend, despite Reed's pleas to her to stay because he felt
"'depressed and weak.'" Id. After Varga's departure, Reed went to Green's apartment, where the two talked for a while until Green provocatively unbuttoned her
pants and tried to initiate intercourse with Reed. Id. When Reed declined, Green
ridiculed him and the two argued. Id. at 244-45, 627 A.2d at 634. The argument
escalated and Green wielded a knife. Id. at 245, 627 A.2d at 634. Reed responded by
telling Green to put it down and "'back off.'" Id. According to Reed, Green told him
to leave, but then instantly grabbed a board and charged him. Id. In response, Reed
"'freaked out[,]'" grabbed the knife, and stabbed Green. Id.
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In May of 1987, a Somerset County grand jury indicted Reed 3 1
for first-degree murder,3 2 first-degree felony murder,3 first-degree
aggravated sexual assault, 34 and third-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose. 5 Prior to trial, Reed's attorney
moved to suppress the confession on the grounds that Reed had
not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights.3 6 The Superior Court, Law Division, Somerset County, denied the motion. The court found that the police had no duty to
Id.
New Jersey law provides:
CC] riminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death[.]
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3a(1) & (2) (West 1982).
33 New Jersey law provides:
[C]riminal homicide constitutes murder when:
31
32

(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one
or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or criminal escape, and in
the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person
causes the death of a person other than one of the participants[.]
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3a(3) (West 1982).
34 New Jersey law provides:
An actor is guilty of aggravated sexual assault if he commits an act of
sexual penetration with another person under any one of the following
circumstances:
(3) The act is committed during the commission, or attempted
commission, whether alone or with one or more other persons, of robbery, kidnapping, homicide, aggravated assault on another, burglary, arson or criminal escape;
(4) The actor is armed with a weapon or any object fashioned in
such a manner as to lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a
weapon and threatens by word or gesture to use the weapon or object[.]
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2a (3) & (4) (West 1982).
35 New Jersey law provides:
Any person who has in his possession any weapon, except a firearm,
with a purpose to use it unlawfully against the person or property of
another is guilty of a crime of the third degree.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4d (West Supp. 1982).
36 Reed, 133 N.J. at 245, 627 A.2d at 634. Reed's attorney argued that Reed's
mental limitations, his isolation from Varga, and the failure of the Assistant Prosecutor to inform Reed that Varga had obtained a lawyer for him combined to form an
extremely coercive atmosphere. Id. This, in turn, prevented Reed from both fully
understanding his rights and the significance of waiving them in order to speak with
police. Id. at 245-46, 627 A.2d at 634. For a discussion of waiver of the Miranda
rights, see supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
37 Id. at 246, 627*A.2d at 634-35.
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inform Reed of Aitken's attempt to contact him because Aitken
had never been formally retained to represent Reed.3 8 The court
further declared that no duty to inform would exist even if Aitken
had been hired to represent Reed.3 9 Consequently, Reed's confession was admitted at trial, 40 and Reed was convicted for knowing
41
murder and aggravated sexual contact.
On appeal, the appellate division rejected Reed's contention
that the police had violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination by failing to inform him of Aitken's availability. 42 Ultimately, however, the appellate court reversed Reed's conviction on
other grounds.4 3 The NewJersey Supreme Court granted certificaId.
Id., 627 A.2d at 635.
Id.
41 Id. at 245, 627 A.2d at 634. New Jersey law provides:
An actor is guilty of aggravated criminal sexual contact if he commits an
act of sexual contact with the victim under any of the circumstances set
forth in 2C:14-2a (2) through (6).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3a. (West 1982). See supra note 34 for an enumeration of the
applicable provisions of N.J.S.A. § 2C:14-2a. See also supra note 32 for the language
of N.J.S.A. § 2C:11-3a(2), New Jersey's knowing murder statute.
Although the Somerset County Prosecutors tried this matter as a capital case, the
jury declined to impose the death penalty. Reed, 133 N.J. at 245, 627 A.2d at 634. On
the murder conviction, the court sentenced Reed to life in prison with a 30 year parole ineligibility period plus a $10,000 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty.
Id. In addition, the court ordered a concurrent five year sentence and $30 V.C.C.B.
penalty for Reed's aggravated criminal sexual contact conviction. Id.
42 State v. Reed, 249 N.J. Super. 41, 48, 592 A.2d 4, 7 (1991), overruLed, 133 N.J.
237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993). In rejecting Reed's self-incrimination argument, the appellate division relied in part upon Moran v. Burbine. Id. at 47-48, 592 A.2d at 7 (citing
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)). In Moran, the United States Supreme Court
held that under the federal constitution, police have no duty to inform a suspect that
an attorney has been contacted on his behalf by a third party. Moran, 475 U.S. at 425.
See supranotes 102-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moran. The appellate division concluded that the actions of the police had not violated Reed's right
against self-incrimination or right to counsel under either federal or New Jersey law.
Reed, 249 N.J. Super. at 48, 592 A.2d at 7.
43 Reed, 249 N.J. Super at 51, 592 A.2d at 7-8. The appellate court reversed Reed's
conviction and remanded the matter to the trial court on the ground that the trial
court's jury instructions had not permitted the jury to consider the lesser included
offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. Id. New Jersey defines passion/provocation manslaughter in the following manner: "[c ] riminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: ... (2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under section
2C: 11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-4b(2) (West 1982).
In challenging his conviction, Reed advanced four grounds for reversal. Reed,
249 N.J. Super. at 44-46, 48, 592 A.2d at 5-7. First, Reed contended that he was unable
to understand and knowingly waive his Miranda rights because he was mentally retarded. Id. at 45, 592 A.2d at 6. The appellate division determined that it had no
reason to disturb the trial court's conclusion that Reed was not mentally retarded. Id.
at 46, 592 A.2d at 6. Reed's second contention was that he should not have been
38
39
40
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tion 4 4 to determine whether the police's failure to inform Reed of
the attorney's request violated Reed's NewJersey state law privilege
against self-incrimination.4 5
Writing for the court, Justice Handler held that when an attorney has been retained for a suspect by another, and the attorney is
available and requests to speak with the suspect, police have a duty
to inform the suspect of the attorney's attempts to contact him.4 6
The court explained that the existence of an attorney-client relationship does not depend upon an express request by the suspect,
and that such a relationship would be deemed to exist whenever
the suspect's friends or family have retained an attorney on the
suspect's behalf.4 7 Moreover, the majority declared that if the police breach their duty to inform the suspect of the attorney's presence, any ensuing waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination
by the suspect will be deemed invalid per se.4" Accordingly, the
court pronounced Reed's waiver and subsequent confession invalid
because it was obtained in violation of these principles.4 9
In 1844, the United States Supreme Court first recognized
that the admission of a confession into evidence implicated the
federal constitution in Bram v. United States.50 In Bram, the captain
interrogated without Varga present to assist him. Id. at 45, 592 A.2d at 6. The appellate division concluded that this contention was premised upon Reed's claim of
mental retardation, and therefore rejected this claim as well. Id. at 46, 592 A.2d at 6.
Reed's third contention was that the refusal of the police to permit his attorney to
speak with him violated his constitutional rights. Id. at 47, 592 A.2d at 6. For a discussion of Reed's third assertion, see supra note 42 and accompanying text. Reed's final
contention, that the jury instructions were erroneous, is discussed above.
44 State v. Reed, 127 N.J. 552, 606 A.2d 365 (1991). Both Reed and the State petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification to appeal. Reed, 133 N.J. at
246, 627 A.2d at 635. The court denied the prosecution's cross petition, which was
based on the appellate division's conclusion that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter. Id.
45 Reed. 133 N.J. at 246-47, 627 A.2d at 635. For a discussion of New Jersey's state
law privilege against self-incrimination, see infra note 117.
46 Id. at 261-62, 627 A.2d at 643.
47 Id. at 261, 627 A.2d at 643.
48 Id. at 262, 627 A.2d at 643.
49 Id. at 269, 627 A.2d at 647. The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate division which reversed Reed's murder conviction, reversed the
appellate division's affirmance of Reed's conviction for aggravated sexual contact,
and remanded the matter to the trial court. Id. at 270, 627 A.2d at 647.
50 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). For a discussion of Bram, see Dix, Modern Confessions,
supra note 9, at 287 (noting that the United States Supreme Court, by excluding
Bram's statement on constitutional grounds, departed from earlier cases which discussed the admissibility of confessions in evidence law terms); Note, Developments in the
Law-Confessions, supra note 9, at 960 (noting the radically different approach to the
admissibility of confessions adopted in Bram); Howard K. Uniman, Note, The Soap Box
Exception to the Miranda Rule: Fifth Amendment ProtectionsSlip Down the Drain, 15 SETON
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of a ship was murdered at sea, and the ship's first mate incriminated himself through a statement made during custodial interrogation.5 1 The Supreme Court held that the admissibility of a
confession was governed by the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination 52 and excluded the first mate's statement
L. REV. 685, 688 (1985) (stating that Bram was the first case in which the
Supreme Court used the Fifth Amendment to bar the admission of a confession).
Prior to Bram, the Court adhered to the common law rule that excluded confessions on an evidentiary rather than constitutional basis. Id. See also Stephen J.
Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 193, 199
(1986) (noting that the admissibility of confessions in early interrogation cases typically hinged on the common law rule of evidence which excluded involuntary confessions); Dix, Modern Confessions, supra note 9, at 286 (noting that the Supreme Court's
initial unwillingness to confront the constitutional issues raised by confession cases
was demonstrated by the fact that the Court had resolved such cases on a purely evidentiary basis); George E. Dix, FederalConstitutionalConfession Law: The 1986 and 1987
Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REv. 231, 234 (1988) [hereinafter Dix, Federal Confessions] (asserting that the United States Supreme Court adopted the common law voluntariness requirement to govern the admissibility of confessions in Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884)).
In Hopt, the Supreme Court admitted the confession of a murder suspect who,
after being left alone for three minutes with one police officer, immediately confessed
upon the arrival of another officer. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584. The Court stated that "[a]
confession, if freely and voluntarily made, is evidence of the most satisfactory character[,]" and that, "a deliberate, voluntary confession of guilt is among the most effectual
proofs in the law .... " Id. at 584-85. The Court, however, declared that the presumption that an innocent person will not give a false confession ceases to apply when "the
HALL

confession appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a

temporal nature," or, "because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of [a
person in authority], which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, ...
deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession
voluntary within the meaning of the law." Id. at 585. For examples of other early
cases which excluded confessions on an evidentiary rather than constitutional basis,
see Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 622-23 (1896); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S.
355, 357 (1896); and Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895).
51 Bram, 168 U.S. at 535-36, 539. While interrogating the first mate, police
stripped him naked and told him that a witness who had been standing at the ship's
wheel had watched him commit the murder. Id. at 539. The first mate incriminated
himself by replying "'he could not see me from there.'" Id. For further explanation
of "custodial interrogation," see infra note 85.
52 Id. at 542. See supra note 9 for an enumeration of the relevant provisions of the
Fifth Amendment. In Bram, the Court specifically held:
In criminal trials, in the courts of the United States, wherever a question
arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the
issue is controlled by that portion of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, commanding that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
Id.
Bram has been heavily criticized by legal commentators for its unsubstantiated
assumption that the Fifth Amendment had always been used to determine the voluntariness of a confession. DAVID M. NISSMAN ET AL., LAW OF CONFESSIONS § 3:2 (1985).
Nissman observed that Wigmore, a noted legal scholar, described Brain as "'the
height of absurdity in misapplication of the law.'" Id. (quotation omitted). McCor-
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as violative of that provision.13 After examining the English common law, the Court determined that both the Fifth Amendment
and the common law voluntariness rule 5 4 were intended to prevent
the same wrongs and secure the same safeguards.5 5 Accordingly,
the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination was merely a crystallization of the common law
voluntariness rule. 6
Although Bram prohibited the admission of involuntary confessions in the federal courts, the decision offered no protection to
mick, another prominent legal intellectual, characterized Bram as a "'historical blunder.'" Id. (quotation omitted). The Court itself even criticized Brain in later
decisions. Id. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 190-91 n.35 (1953) (stating that
Bram "is not a rock upon which to build constitutional doctrine.").
53 Brarn, 168 U.S. at 542-43, 565. The Brain Court stated that the situation surrounding Brain's confession foreclosed any possibility that his statement was purely
voluntary. Id. at 562. The Court averred that Brain's statement must have resulted
from "either hope or fear, or both . . . ." Id.
54 The common law voluntariness rule may be defined as follows: "a confession, in
order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence .... " RUSSELL, supra note
3, at 367. In Hopt v. Utah, the Supreme Court examined this rule and noted that
because the admissibility of a dubious confession "so largely depends upon the special
circumstances connected with the confession .... it is difficult, if not impossible, to
formulate a rule that will comprehend all cases." Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 583
(1884). Although the Supreme Court determined that it was unnecessary to establish
a general rule to govern the admissibility of confessions, it concluded that a confession was admissible unless:
[T]he confession appears to have been made either in consequence of
inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the
presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of
the accused, in reference to the charge, deprives him of that freedom of
will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the
meaning of the law.
Id. at 583, 585. See infra note 50 for a discussion of Hopt.
55 Brain, 168 U.S. at 543.
56 Id. See Urick, supra note 9, at 127 (explaining that it was not surprising that
Bram rested constitutional confessions law on the right against self-incrimination because that had been the practice at common law since the seventeenth century).
Despite the novel pronouncement contained in Bram, its constitutional significance remains uncertain. Dix, Modern Confessions, supra note 9, at 289. In several
cases that arose after Brain and involved the admissibility of confessions, the Court
ostensibly ignored Brain and failed to mention a constitutional foundation for the
confessions rule that the Court applied. Id. See, e.g., Ziang Sung Wan v. United States,
266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924) (excluding an involuntary confession with no mention of the
Fifth Amendment); Perovich v. United States, 205 U.S. 86, 91 (1907) (permitting a
third party's testimony of statements made by the suspect without reference of the
Fifth Amendment); see also, Markman, supra note 50, at 199-200 (contending that
Bram was decided on faulty legal premises, and that Wigmore and other commentators have exposed the insupportable assumptions of the decision).
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Because Bram's holding was
defendants tried in state courts.
based upon the Fifth Amendment, which was not binding on the
states until 1964, state courts were not required to exclude confessions obtained in violation of Bram's precepts.5" The admissibility
of confessions in the state courts prior to that time, however, was
not completely free from federal judicial review.5 9
The United States Supreme Court barred the admission of a
state court confession for the first time in 1936.60 In Brown v. Mississippi,6 1 the Court excluded an involuntary confession in a state
court proceeding by using the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.6 2 In Brown, Mississippi police tortured three black suspects until they confessed to murdering a white man.6 3 The
57 See LAFAvE AND ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 294.
58 Id. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision

in Barron v. The Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore,specific guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights are not directly
binding upon the states and must be incorporated through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) ("Had the framers of these amendments intended
them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have ...
expressed that intention."); see infra note 62 for a narration of the relevant provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Originally, the Supreme Court held that the states were not bound by the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Lawrence Herman, The Supreme
Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation,25 OHIO ST. L.J. 449, 462 (1964). See Twining v. NewJersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908) (holding that "the exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not secured by any part of the
Federal Constitution."), affd, Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). In 1964, the
Supreme Court overruled Twining and held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self-incrimination was binding upon the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 8 (1964). See infra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Malloy. Thus, at the time Bram was decided, the
decision offered no protection against the admission of involuntary confessions in the
state courts. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 294.
59 Markman, supra note 50, at 205. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text
for a discussion on the admissibility of confessions in the state courts.
60 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 294 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278,
286 (1936)).
61 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
62 Id. at 287. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... "U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
63 Brown, 297 U.S. at 282-83. In Brown, police obtained confessions from three
murder suspects through the use of physical torture, including hanging one suspect
from a tree and beating the others with buckled leather straps. Id. at 281-82. The
trial court and the Mississippi Supreme Court admitted the confessions and convicted
the suspects. Id. at 279-80. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed,
finding that the manner in which suspect's confessions were obtained violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 287. The Court, however,
did not exclude the confessions on the basis of the suspects' Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. Id.
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Supreme Court held that the admission of the confessions into evidence violated due process because the manner in which the confessions were obtained offended fundamental principles of liberty
and justice.6 4 The Court reasoned that the states were free to
adopt different procedural requirements for their own courts provided that those requirements conformed with due process of
law.

65

The Fourteenth Amendment due process analysis announced
in Brown required courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
whether each confession was truly voluntary based upon the totality
of the circumstances. 66 Although due process analysis permitted
the Supreme Court to review the decisions of state courts, the
Court gradually became dissatisfied with this method because it
was highly fact specific, not amenable to judicial review, and left
little guidance for police concerning interrogation procedure.6 7
Consequently, by the mid-1960s, the Court was ready to abandon
this method and sought a new approach for determining the admissibility of confessions in state judicial systems.6"
64 Id. at 286. The Court explained that "[t]he due process clause requires 'that
state action . ..shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.'" Id. (citation
omitted). The Court then declared that "[i] t would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken to procure the confessions
of [the Brown defendants] .... " Id.
65 Id. at 285. The Court explained that the states are free to regulate procedure in
their own courts in accordance with their own conceptions of policy unless in doing
so they offend "'some principal of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id. (citation omitted).
66 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 296. The totality of the circumstances standard generally requires the court to assess the conduct of the police in procuring the
confession as well as the status and characteristics of the individual confessing. Id.; see
also Mary A. Crossley, Note, Miranda and the State Constitution:State Courts Take a Stand,
39 VAND. L. REV. 1693, 1705 (1986) (discussing the manner in which the Supreme
Court utilized the totality of the circumstances approach to exclude involuntary confessions during the 1950s).
67 Alan W. Clark, Note, CriminalProcedure-Confessions-Waiverof Fifth Amendment
Rights Held Valid Although Police Failed to Inform Suspect of Attorney's Attempt to Contact
Him, 17 SETON HALL L. REv. 402, 408 n.65 (1987); Dix, Federal Confessions, supra note
50, at 235-36 (enumerating factors that led to the Court's dissatisfaction with the voluntariness test). See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 298-99 (critiquing the
voluntariness test).
68 Crossley, supra note 66, at 1706 (stating that the Court wanted to replace the
dubiety of the voluntariness standard with a concrete, objective standard); see also
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 299 (noting that the Supreme Court undertook a
search for an alternative means of dealing with the confessions problem); Horace W.
Jordan, Jr.,. Review, Fifth and Sixth Amendments-Changing the Balance of Miranda, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 666, 667 (1986) (declaring that the Court became increasingly dissatisfied with the voluntariness test for determining the validity of confessions
in the early 1960s).
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In a series of cases beginning with Malloy v. Hogan69 and culminating in Miranda v. Arizona, ° the Supreme Court replaced the
due process approach to determining the admissibility of confessions with an objective standard based upon the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. 71 In Malloy, a suspect subpoenaed to testify in a state
court proceeding invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to answer any questions. 72 The Supreme Court held that the Fifth
69 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See infra notes 72-76 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Malloy.
70 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda.
71 Crossley, supra note 66, at 1706. See Dix, Federal Confessions, supra note 50, at 235
(noting that Miranda ended the preeminence of due process analysis).
The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Fifth Amendment does not explicitly confer a
right to counsel; however, the Miranda Court concluded that the right to have an
attorney present during interrogation was an "indispensable" safeguard to the suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
469. Despite the similar protections afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, the
two provisions are not tautologous because only one of the amendments is implicated
in many confession cases, Tomkovicz, supra note 9, at 977. In order for the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to arise, there must be deliberate elicitation of statements by the government after the institution of formal legal proceedings. Id. at 983.
For the Fifth Amendment's ancillary right to counsel to arise, there must be interrogation in a custodial setting. Id. at 990-91. Thus, if intentional elicitation occurs after
formal legal proceedings have been initiated, but either interrogation or custody of
the suspect is lacking, only the Sixth Amendment applies. Id. at 977 n.6. See, e.g.,
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 272-75 (1980) (finding the Sixth Amendment
applicable while holding the Fifth Amendment inapplicable because of a lack of interrogation). Alternatively, if custodial interrogation has occurred before formal legal
proceedings have been initiated, only the Fifth Amendment applies. Tomkovicz,
supra note 9, at 977 n.6. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428-32 (1986). For
a discussion of Moran, see infra notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
72 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 3. Malloy involved a defendant who was arrested in a 1959
gambling raid in Connecticut. Id. Two years later, Malloy was subpoenaed to testify
in a gambling investigation conducted by the Hartford County Superior Court. Id.
Malloy invoked the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination and refused to answer any questions. Id. The Superior Court found Malloy in contempt
and imprisoned him until he was willing to answer. Id. Malloy applied to the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus, but the court denied him such relief. Id. The
Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed, holding that the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in a state court proceeding. Id. On
appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to state court proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 6.
Malloy is significant because it is the first modern case to merge the privilege
against self-incrimination with constitutional confessions law. NIssmAN, supra note 52
at § 2:13. See also Charles E. Moylan, Jr., &John Sonsteng, The Privilege Against Compelled Self-Incrimination, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 249, 250 (1990) (stating that constitutional law concerning the admissibility of confessions differed from the
constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination). Prior to Malloy, Brain v.
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Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was binding
upon the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment.7" The
Court announced that the admissibility of confessions in state
courts was governed by the same standards employed in the federal
courts since Bram. 4 Moreover, the Court implicitly denounced the
earlier due process approach by explaining that the question was
not whether the conduct of the police in extracting the confession
was outrageous, but whether the confession itself was free and voluntary.7 5 Consequently, the Court held that the suspect's Fifth
Amendment invocation was proper even though
it had occurred in
76
a state, rather than federal, proceeding.
Immediately following Malloy, the Supreme Court announced
two decisions which further demonstrated the Court's dissatisfaction with due process analysis.7 7 First, in Massiah v. United States,78
the Court held that a defendant possessed a right to counsel during any post-indictment interrogation, and that any confession obtained in contravention of this right was inadmissible as a violation
of the Sixth Amendment. 79 Next, in Escobedo v. Illinois,8" the Court
United States was the only case that equated the coerced confessions rule with the
privilege against self-incrimination, and Bram has been highly criticized by legal commentators for making that connection. NIssMAN, supra note 52 at § 2:13. See supra
note 52 for a discussion of various critiques of Bra In Malloy, Justice Brennan suggested that the Court had been using Fifth Amendment analysis to resolve confession
cases since Brown. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6 (citing Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278
(1936)). This assertion was simply inaccurate. NissMAN, supranote 52, at § 2:13. Following Brown, the Court decided more than 30 state confessions cases using the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and in none of them did the Court suggest
a Fifth Amendment basis for excluding the confession. Id.
73 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 6. The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment
secured against state infringement the same right that the Fifth Amendment guaranteed against federal intrusion-the right of an individual to remain silent until he
decides to speak in the unbridled exercise of his own free will, and to endure no
penalty for such silence. Id. at 8.
74 Id. at 7. The Court elaborated on the state/federal court distinction, noting
that "[ i ] t would be incongruous to have different standards determine the validity of a
claim of privilege based upon the same feared prosecution, depending on whether
the claim was asserted in a state or federal court." Id. at 11. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the same standard must govern whether an accused's silence is justified in both federal and state court proceedings. Id.
75 Id. at 7. The Court commented that the shift from due process examination to
Fifth Amendment analysis reflected the acknowledgment that the American criminal
justice system was accusatorial, not inquisitorial. Id.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Crossley, supra note 66, at 1705-06 (noting that the Court's dissatisfaction with
due process analysis led to its decisions in Massiah and Escobedo).
78 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
79 Id. at 204-06. Interestingly, Massiah did not involve custodial interrogation. Id.
at 203. In Massiah, defendant Massiah was indicted on federal narcotics charges. Id.
at 202. Massiah retained counsel, entered a not guilty plea, and was released on bail.
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extended Massiah's Sixth Amendment protection to a pre-indictment confession by declaring that a suspect's right to counsel attached as soon as police investigation shifts from the investigatory
to the accusatory stage."'
While Massiah and Escobedo foreshadowed the demise of due
Id. Massiah's co-defendant Colson, who unbeknownst to Massiah was working with
the police and had a radio transmitter hidden in his car, induced Massiah to discuss
the upcoming case and make damaging admissions. Id. at 202-03. Authorities monitoring the transmitter overheard Massiah and testified to these admissions at trial over
Massiah's objections. Id. at 203. Thejury convicted Massiah on the narcotics charges,
and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. Massiah appealed on the grounds that his
statements were obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Id. at 203-04. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that the use of
Massiah's incriminating statements at trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 207.
80 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
81 Id. at 492. See Crossley, sup-a note 66, at 1706 (noting that Escobedo was an extension of Massiah); Markman, supra note 50, at 207 (noting that Escobedo was an expansion of Massiah's holding because Escobedo's interrogation preceded his indictment,
whereas Massiah's holding specifically applied to post-indictment statements).
In Escobedo, police arrested Escobedo and brought him in for questioning concerning the murder of his brother-in-law. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. Escobedo asked
to speak with his lawyer, and Escobedo's lawyer asked to speak with his client, but
police refused both requests. Id. at 479-82. Shortly thereafter, police questioned Escobedo, who in response made damaging statements concerning his knowledge of
the crime. Id. at 482-83. At no time prior to the questioning did police advise Escobedo of his rights. Id. at 483. Escobedo moved to suppress his statements, but the
trial court denied the motion and convicted Escobedo of murder. Id. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Illinois held Escobedo's statements inadmissible and reversed his
conviction. Id. The State obtained a rehearing, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed Escobedo's conviction. Id. The United States Supreme Court, citing Massiah
and Bran, concluded that the fact that Escobedo was interrogated prior to being indicted was inapposite and reversed Escobedo's conviction. Id. at 484-86, 492. The
Court stated that Escobedo's statement occurred at a "'stage when legal aid and advice'" were critical, and held that:
[W]here . . . the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an

unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult
with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment," (citations omitted) and that no statement elicited by the
police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal
trial.
Id. at 486, 490-91. The Court clarified that its holding was intended to have no effect
on the power of police to investigate "'an unsolved crime,'" but rather determined
that "when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on
the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-our adversary system begins to
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his lawyer." Id. at 492.
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process analysis in the confessions context, the Supreme Court did
not completely supplant this approach until two years later in the
landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona.8 2 In Miranda, the Court
shifted its focus from the Sixth Amendment to the Fifth Amendment and adopted a per se rule to regulate the admissibility of confessions.8" Chief Justice Warren, writing for a sharply divided
Court,8 4 began by proclaiming a need for specific procedural safeguards to combat the coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation8 5 as well as to ensure protection of the suspect's privilege
384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
Id. at 444-45, 467-75. See Crossley, supra note 66, at 1706 (noting that Miranda
adopted a per se rule respecting the admissibility of confessions). Mirandawas actually
a consolidation of one federal and three state court cases involving similar factual
situations. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57, 491-99. All four cases involved incommunicado interrogation of suspects in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in selfincriminating statements made without sufficient warnings of constitutional rights.
Id. at 445, 456-57, 491-99.
Miranda itself involved the arrest and interrogation of rape suspect Ernesto Miranda. Id. at 491-92. Phoenix police apprehended Miranda at his home and transported him to the stationhouse. Id. at 491. At the police station, Miranda was
sequestered in an interrogation room and questioned for two hours. Id. Eventually,
Miranda admitted to committing the rape and kidnapping. Id. at 492. Though the
officers had not advised Miranda of his right to have an attorney present during the
interrogation, Miranda gave the officers a written confession which contained a typewritten paragraph stating that the confession had been made "'with full knowledge of
[his] legal rights ... ' Id. at 491-92. Miranda's confession was admitted at trial, and
Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape. Id. at 492. On appeal, the Arizona
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. The Arizona court, in concluding that Miranda's rights
had not been violated, relied heavily on the fact that Miranda had not requested an
attorney. Id. The United States Supreme Court reversed, noting that Miranda was
not advised of his right to counsel and that the statement contained in the written
confession did not amount to a valid waiver of his rights. Id.
Following the Court's reversal of his conviction, Miranda was retried on the rape
charges by the State of Arizona. Uniman, supra note 50, at 693 n.66 (citing Evan
Thomas, Court at the Crossroads,TIME MAG., Oct. 8, 1984, at 33). Miranda was convicted and sentenced to 30 years in prison, but was paroled in 1972. Id. Four years
after his release, Miranda was stabbed to death over a card game in a Phoenix bar. Id.
84 Miranda was decided by a five-to-four majority, with Justices Black, Brennan,
Douglas, and Fortas joining Chief Justice Warren's opinion, and Justices Clark,
Harlan, Stewart, and White dissenting. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 499, 504.
85 Miranda defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. In determining whether
the suspect is "in custody," the question is how a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would have perceived his situation. 23 CJ.S. CriminalLaw § 899(a) (1993)
(citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). Courts look to whether a
reasonable person in the suspect's situation would have considered himself formally
arrested or otherwise not free to leave. Id.
"Interrogation" is defined as "express questioning or its functional equivalent."
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). Interrogation includes any police
actions or utterances that the maker should know are likely to evoke an incriminating
82
83
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against self-incrimination. 6 To address this need,.the Mirandamajority declared that, prior to conducting any custodial interrogation, police must administer express warnings to a suspect
informing him of certain constitutional rights.8 7 Specifically, the
Court proclaimed that police must inform a suspect that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used against
him in court, and that he has the right to an attorney, either retained or appointed."8 Failure to give these warnings, the Court
concluded, would render inadmissible any subsequent statement
89
obtained from the suspect.
Although Miranda established a new benchmark for protecting the rights of the accused, the majority nevertheless permitted a
suspect to forgo the benefits of these constitutional protections by
waiving them.9" In order for a suspect's wavier to be valid, however, the Court insisted that the waiver be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.9 1 Chief Justice Warren, in an attempt to
clarify the parameters of a valid waiver, noted that the Court has
always set strict standards for the waiver of a constitutional right.9 2
response from the accused. Id. at 301. The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[a] practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect ... amounts to interrogation." Id.
86 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
87 Id. at 468-73.
88 Id. at 479. The Court noted, however, that the express warnings in the precise
formulation articulated by the Court were not mandated by the United States Constitution. Id. at 467 (stating "we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires
adherence to any particular solution ....").

In other words, "the Miranda warnings"

themselves were not required by the Constitution. See id. Rather, these warnings were
merely prophylactic rules designed to ensure that the suspect's privilege against selfincrimination, which was Constitutionally mandated, was safeguarded. Id. See generally, Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (commenting that "[t]he Court
recognized that [the Miranda warnings] were not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected.").
89 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
90 Id. at 444, 479.
91 Id. With regard to waiver, Miranda forewarned that if, after a suspect has been
advised of his rights, interrogation continues in the absence of counsel and a statement is obtained, a "heavy burden" rests on the prosecution to prove that the suspect
knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to counsel and against self-incrimination.
Id. at 475 (citation omitted). Further clarifying waiver, the Court explained that an
explicit assertion that a suspect is willing to speak with police, followed immediately
by a statement, could comprise a valid waiver; however, the Court cautioned that a
waiver could not be inferred from silence or the simple fact that a confession was
eventually obtained. Id. The Court additionally noted that when custodial interrogation is involved, it is impermissible to conclude that the privilege was waived simply
because the suspect answered some questions or gave some information prior to invoking the right to remain silent. Id. at 475-76.
92 Id. at 475 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). The Miranda
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The Court forewarned that a heavy burden would be placed on the
state's shoulders to prove the validity of the waiver if the state
sought to use a suspect's statements at trial.9 3
Following Miranda, a surfeit of litigation arose concerning the
requirements for a valid waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.9 4 To clarify this confusion, the Supreme Court endorsed
the "totality of the circumstances" approach for determining the
validity of a waiver in North Carolinav. Butler.95 In Butler, a suspect
who agreed to speak with police sought to have resultant inculpatory statements9 6 excluded on the ground that his refusal to sign a
Court specifically "re-assert[ed]" theJohnson v. Zerbst standards as applied to custodial
interrogation. Id. In Zerbst, two defendants were indicted for passing counterfeit
notes. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 460. Unable to obtain counsel, the defendants were forced
to represent themselves at trial. Id. Both defendants were convicted, and thereafter
failed to file a timely appeal. Id. at 460, 462. The district court denied the defendants' habeas corpus appeal, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 459. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, overturned the convictions on the grounds that
the defendants may have been denied their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
remanded the matter on the issue of the defendants' waiver of counsel. Id. at 459,
469.
Discussing waiver, the Zerbst Court noted that "'courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . 'do not
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.'" Id. at 464 (citations omitted). Further, the Court stated that "[t]he determination of whether there has been
an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background,
experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. It is worth noting that Zerbst involved
the Sixth Amendment, which implies that the Court intended a waiver of Miranda's
Fifth Amendment rights to be governed by Sixth Amendment standards. NISSMtAN,
supra note 52, at § 6:2.
93 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. The Court explained that because the State must
establish the isolated conditions under which the custodial interrogation takes place,
and the State possesses the only means of supplying corroborated evidence of the
warnings given during the incommunicado interrogation, "the burden is rightly on its
shoulders." Id.
94 Althea Kuller, Casenote, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police Interference With the Attorney-ClientRelationship, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 251, 261 (1986) (discussing
cases following Miranda in which the Court further defined the standards required for
a valid waiver); see, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (creating a
conclusive presumption against the validity of a waiver obtained when police initiate
further questioning after a suspect has requested an attorney); Fare v. Michael C., 442
U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (declaring that the "totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a [valid] waiver.... ."); North Carolina v.
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (holding that a waiver need not be explicit; a waiver
can be inferred from the suspect's words and actions); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 104 (1975) (holding that once a suspect has exercised the right to remain silent,
the admissibility of any statements obtained thereafter depends upon whether the
police "scrupulously honor[ ]" the suspect's decision).
95 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
96 See supra note 2 for a definition of "inculpatory statement."
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waiver of rights form had invalidated his waiver.9 7 The Court declared that an express waiver was not required because waiver
could be inferred from the suspect's words and actions. 98 In accordance with this approach, the Court determined that the suspect's waiver was valid and his statements were admissible at trial. 99
The totality of the circumstances approach endorsed in Butler
required courts to review the facts of each case to determine
whether the suspect's waiver was truly voluntary.'
The Supreme
Court has indicated that under this standard, a seemingly voluntary
waiver may be deemed invalid if elicited in an atmosphere of coercion or obtained as a result of police deceit or trickery.1 0 1 In 1986,
the Supreme Court's allegiance to this principle was tested in Mo10 2
ran v. Burbine.
The Moran Court considered the effect of two questionable
97 Butler, 441 U.S. at 371. See supra note 24 for a discussion of Miranda waiver
forms. In Butler, law enforcement officials arrested suspect Willie Butler for felonious
assault, kidnapping, and armed robbery. Id. at 370. Prior to interrogating Butler, FBI
agents provided him with the Bureau's "Advice of Rights" form. Id. Butler read the
form, and although he told the agents that he understood his rights, he refused to
sign the waiver. Id. at 371. The agents advised Butler that he was not required to
speak to them or sign the form, but that they did wish to speak with him. Id. Butler
replied, "'I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.'" Id. After making this
assertion, Butler made inculpatory statements to the agents. Id.
At trial, Butler moved to suppress his statements on the grounds that he had not
made a valid waiver of his right to counsel. Id. The trial court denied the motion,
and Butler was convicted of the three charges. Id. at 371-72. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina held Butler's waiver invalid and reversed his convictions. Id.
at 372. The North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted Miranda as requiring an express waiver of the right to counsel, and such a waiver was absent in Butler's case. Id.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that an express statement of
waiver was not an absolute prerequisite to the finding of a valid waiver of the right to
counsel. Id. at 373. The Court stated that "in at least some cases waiver can be clearly
inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id.
98 Id. at 373.
99 Id. at 373, 376.
100 Id. at 374-75. Specifically, the Court stated that "[e]ven when a right so fundamental as that to counsel at trial is involved, the question of waiver must be determined on 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Id. (citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). See supra note 92 for a discussion of the standard for
waiver under Zerbst.
101 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). The Miranda Court cautioned
that "any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver
will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." Id. See
also LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, at 339 (noting that the Miranda Court suggested
that even absent threats or promises by the police, a waiver obtained under coercive
circumstances would not be upheld). But see, id. (noting that despite Miranda's intimation that the use of trickery or coercion would result in the per se invalidation of a
defendant's waiver, lower courts have not adhered to this directive).
102 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
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police actions on a suspect's waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination.0 3 In Moran, police failed to inform a custodial suspect that an attorney had attempted to contact him, and
misinformed the suspect's attorney that the suspect would not be
questioned." 4 The suspect, Brian Burbine, sought to suppress his
confession on the grounds that the police's conduct had violated
his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.1 0 5
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, rejected each of Burbine's
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 417. In Moran, Cranston, Rhode Island Police arrested Brian Burbine for
burglary. Id. at 416. While Burbine was in custody, police learned that he may have
been involved in the unsolved murder of a young woman that occurred in Providence, Rhode Island earlier that year. Id. Cranston Police contacted Providence Police, who in response traveled to Cranston to question Burbine about the murder. Id.
While Burbine was in custody, his sister, who was unaware of the murder charge,
contacted the Public Defender's Officer to obtain an attorney for Burbine for the
burglary charge. Id. An attorney from the Public Defender's Office contacted the
Cranston Police and informed them that she would be available if the police wanted
to question Burbine that evening. Id. at 417. The police informed the attorney that
Burbine would not be questioned until the next day, but they did not inform her that
the Providence Police were present or that Burbine was a murder suspect. Id. Less
than one hour after the Public Defender's call to the police station, Providence Police
advised Burbine of his Miranda rights and began their interrogation. Id. Burbine
waived his rights three times, each time executing a Miranda waiver form, and then
confessed to the murder. Id. at 417-18. At no time during that evening was Burbine
informed of the attorney's phone call, nor did he ever request to speak with an attorney. Id.
Burbine moved to suppress his confession prior to trial, but the trial court denied
the motion, concluding that Burbine had validly waived his right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 418. At trial, Burbine was convicted of first degree murder. Id. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the conviction,
rejecting Burbine's contention that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments had been
violated. Id. Burbine next applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the Federal District
Court for the District of Rhode Island, but the district court denied his motion. Id. at
419. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Burbine's waiver
had been tainted by the failure of the police to inform him of the attorney's phone
call. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
finding no violation of Burbine's Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at
420-34. For further discussion of Moran, see Gary Hirsch, Criminal Procedure II: The
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 251 (1988) (proclaiming
that Burbine is not likely to induce the total demise of Miranda);Jordan, supra note 68,
at 690 (professing that Moran thwarts Miranda's spirit).
105 Moran, 475 U.S. at 421, 428, 432. Specifically, Burbine claimed that the police
violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to inform him of his attorney's phone
call, or, in the alternative, that the Court should condemn such conduct by the police
in order to fully protect Miranda'sFifth Amendment values. Id. at 421. Burbine next
claimed that the conduct of the police had violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Id. at 428. Finally, Burbine argued that the actions of the police were so
repugnant that they violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 432. Justice O'Connor rejected each of these arguments and upheld Burbine's
conviction. Id. at 428, 432-34.
103
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10 6
contentions and upheld his waiver and conviction.
The Court, in response to Burbine's claim that the conduct of
the police had rendered his waiver invalid under the Fifth Amendment, held that events occurring outside of the suspect's presence
could not affect the suspect's ability to intelligently waive his
rights.10 7 Moreover, the Court determined that because the purpose of the warnings required by Mirandawas to protect the suspect's rights, any deceit directed towards the suspect's attorney was
irrelevant when considering the validity of the suspect's waiver.10 8
Thus, the Moran Court concluded that under the federal constitution, police have no duty to inform a suspect of an attorney's attempt to confer with that suspect.10 9 The Court noted, however,
that states were free to adopt different requirements as a matter of
state law. 1 0
Six years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court accepted Mo-

Id.
Id. at 422. Justice O'Connor criticized the appellate court's reasoning by
stressing that "[u]nder the analysis of the Court of Appeals, the same defendant,
armed with the same information and confronted with precisely the same police conduct, would have knowingly waived his Miranda rights had a lawyer not telephoned
the police station to inquire about his status." Id. Justice O'Connor observed that
"[n]othing in any of our waiver decisions or in our understanding of the essential
components of a valid waiver requires so incongruous a result." Id. The Court acknowledged that the additional information would have been valuable to Burbine,
and that it may even have altered his decision to confess, but the Court refused to
require the police to supply a suspect with a steady stream of information to help that
suspect calibrate his self-interest when deciding whether or not to confess. Id.
108 Id. at 423-24. See also Clark, supra note 67, at 406 (stating that the Moran Court
"recognized that Mirandawarnings are designed to protect the suspect's fifth and sixth
amendment rights and that any misinformation conveyed to an attorney is, therefore,
irrelevant to a fifth amendment analysis."). Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected
Moran's Sixth Amendment argument because Burbine's confession occurred before
adversarial judicial proceedings had been initiated, a prerequisite for application of
the Sixth Amendment. Moran, 475 U.S. at 428-32. The Court also rejected Burbine's
Fourteenth Amendment claim on the grounds that the conduct of the police fell
short of the type of misconduct that "so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society" as
to warrant federal intrusion into the operation of state criminal processes. Id. at 43234.
109 Moran, 475 U.S. at 425. The Moran Court acknowledged that such a rule may
further Miranda's purpose of dispelling the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation. Id. Justice O'Connor, however, concluded that overriding practical considerations cautioned against the adoption of such a rule. Id. Moreover, the Court
remarked that adopting such a rule "would have the inevitable consequence of muddying Miranda's otherwise relatively clear waters." Id.
110 Id. at 428. The Court explained that "[niothing we say today disables the States
from adopting different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as
a matter of state law." Id. The Court's holding was merely that the court of appeals
erred in interpreting the Fifth Amendment to mandate the exclusion of Burbine's
three confessions. Id.
106
107
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ran's invitation in State v. Reed.'
Specifically, the Reed court addressed the issue of whether a suspect's ostensibly voluntary waiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination was rendered invalid by
the police's failure to inform the suspect of an attorney's attempt
to contact him.' 1 2 Justice Handler, writing for the majority, began
by noting that a conflict existed between the United States
Supreme Court and the majority of the state courts that had considered this issue." 3 The justice explained that while the United
States Supreme Court permitted a statement obtained as a result of
police interference with attorney/suspect communication to be admitted at trial,11 4 the state courts were practically unanimous in ex15
cluding a confession obtained under analogous circumstances.'
133 N.J. 237, 627 A.2d 630 (1993).
Id. at 246-47, 627 A.2d at 635.
Id. at 248-49, 627 A.2d at 636.
114 See Moran, 475 U.S. at 428, 432-34 (1986). For a discussion of Moran, see supra
notes 102-110 and accompanying text.
115 Reed, 133 N.J. at 248, 627 A.2d at 636. The court noted that "Moran signalled a
marked departure from the fifth amendment jurisprudence that state and federal
courts had established prior to Moran." Id. The Reed court observed that the vast
majority of state courts that considered this issue prior to Moran held the suspects'
waivers invalid. Id. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 703 P.2d 667, 672-73 (Colo. Ct. App.
1985) (holding that a defendant could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right
to counsel when police failed to inform him that an attorney sought to consult with
him); Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 686 (Del. 1983) (holding that police conduct in
failing to inform a suspect of his attorney's presence vitiated the suspect's waiver of
the right to counsel); Haliburton v. State, 476 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985) (reversing a
defendant's conviction on the grounds that the defendant's otherwise valid waiver was
negated by the police's failure to inform him that an attorney hired by his sister was
present and sought to render assistance), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 475 U.S.
1078 (1986), affd on remand, 514 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2910
(1991); People v. Smith, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (Ill. 1982) (holding that a suspect
could not knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel when police failed
to inform him that an attorney had been retained and wished to consult with him),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 937 (1983); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1274, 1277-78 (La.
1982) (holding that police violated the defendant's state constitutional and statutory
right to remain silent and right to counsel by failing to inform the defendant of his
attorney's attempts to contact him); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 450 N.E.2d 566, 570
(Mass. 1983) (holding that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel was vitiated by
the failure of police to inform the defendant that counsel appointed to represent him
on an unrelated charge sought to render assistance on the present charge); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 244 N.E.2d 560, 566-67 (Mass. 1969) (holding that police's
failure to advise a suspect of counsel's presence precluded admission of any statements made by the suspect after counsel's arrival at the stationhouse); People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539 (N.Y. 1968) (holding that once police are informed that a
defendant is represented by counsel, the right to counsel attaches and the defendant
cannot waive that right in the absence of counsel); State v. Stephens, 266 S.E.2d 588,
592-93 (N.C. 1980) (holding invalid the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel
and the right against self-incrimination because police deceived the defendant and
his attorney by failing to inform them that interrogation had commenced); State v.
Luck, 472 N.E.2d 1097, 1102-04 (Ohio 1984) (holding that police violated a defend111
112
113

1994]

NOTE

Justice Handler observed that Reed compelled the New Jersey
Supreme Court to examine New Jersey law to decide whether to
permit such a confession to be used at trial as well as to establish
guidelines for state law enforcement officials to follow while con16
ducting custodial interrogations.'
ant's Sixth Amendment rights by failing to inform her that an attorney had been
retained and wished to speak with her), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Lewis v.
State, 695 P.2d 528, 529 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (excluding a confession on the
ground that the defendant's waiver was not knowingly and voluntarily made when
police failed to inform the defendant of his attorney's presence at the police station);
State v. Haynes, 602 P.2d 272, 277 (Or. 1979) (holding that a suspect could not knowingly waive his right to counsel when police failed to inform him that an attorney had
been retained on his behalf and sought to consult with him), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945
(1980); Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 370 A.2d 322, 323-24 (Pa. 1977) (holding that a
defendant's failure to request counsel could not constitute a valid waiver when police
refused to inform the defendant that an attorney sought to render assistance); State v.
Hickman, 338 S.E.2d 188, 194-95 (W. Va. 1985) (holding that police had a duty to
inform a suspect that an attorney had been retained on his behalf).
The New Jersey Supreme Court further noted that several courts have had the
opportunity to reconsider this issue following the Supreme Court's decision in Moran.
Reed, 133 NJ. at 249, 627 A.2d at 636. The court observed that some of these courts
expressly rejected Moran as violative of their respective state constitutions. Id.; see, e.g.,
People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166, 1174-77 (Cal. 1986) (holding that police must
inform a suspect of an attorney's attempts to contact him), superseded &ystatute as stated
in People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1, 20-21 (1992) (citing CAL. CONST. ART. I, § 28), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 114 (1993); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (Conn. 1988) (holding that police have a duty to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to contact him);
Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 176 (Del. 1990) (expressly reaffirming Weber);
Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d at 1090 (holding that the police's failure to inform the
suspect of the attorney's request violated the due process clause of the Florida state
constitution); State v. Isom, 761 P.2d 524, 527 (Or. 1988) (impliedly reaffirming
Haynes); Roeder v. State, 768 S.W.2d 745, 754-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a
suspect could not knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment rights when
police failed to inform him that an attorney had been retained on his behalf and
sought to render advice).
The court, however, omitted decisions that deviate from the majority rule and
harmonize with Moran. See, e.g., Callahan v. State, 557 So. 2d 1292, 1303 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1989) (holding that police did not violate a suspect's rights by failing to inform
him of the presence of an attorney who was contacted by the suspect's father), aff'd,
Exparte Callahan, 557 So. 2d 1311 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990); Blanks
v. State, 330 S.E.2d 575, 579 (Ga. 1985) (concluding that a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights were not violated when police refused to inform the suspect that an attorney retained by the suspect's father was present and wished to confer with the
suspect), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1090 (1986); Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299, 304-08
(Md. 1986) (admitting into evidence a defendant's statement on remand, based on
Moran, after previously excluding the same statement in Lodowski v. Maryland, 490
A.2d 1228 (Md. 1985)), vacated, Maryland v. Lodowski, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986), cert.
denied, Lodowski v. Maryland, 475 U.S. 1086 (1986)); State v. Beck, 687 S.W.2d 155,
156-59 (Mo. 1985) (holding a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel valid despite
police's failure to inform the defendant that an attorney had been retained and
sought to consult with him), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
116 Reed, 133 NJ. at 249-50, 627 A.2d at 636-37.
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Justice Handler first discussed New Jersey's state law privilege
against self-incrimination." 7 The justice explained that New
Jersey's privilege against self-incrimination may be thought of as a
core right that is both defined and protected by ancillary rights,
such as the right to have an attorney present during interrogation. 18 To fully preserve the underlying core right, Justice Han117 Id. at 250-53, 627 A.2d at 637-38. As the colonies acquired statehood in the late
1700s, many states expressly included the right against self-incrimination in their bills
of rights. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT 409-10 (1986). States
that included such a provision were Delaware (1776), Maryland (1776), North Carolina (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), Virginia (1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts
(1780) and New Hampshire (1784). Id. NewJersey, however, was one of four states
that did not secure the right against self-incrimination in its state constitution. Id. at
410. Thus, the New Jersey State Constitution contains no express provision conferring a right against self-incrimination. Reed, 133 N.J. at 250, 627 A.2d at 637. Nevertheless, New Jersey has always recognized the existence of the right against selfincrimination and vigorously protected that right on both a common-law and a statutory basis. Id. (citing State v. Fary, 19 N.J. 431, 435, 117 A.2d 499, 501 (1955) (stating
that "[a]lthough not written into our State Constitution . . . the privilege has been
firmly established in NewJersey since our beginnings as a State[.]") and State v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 622, 55 A. 743, 744 (1903) (declaring "[a]lthough we have not
deemed it necessary to insert in our constitution [the right against self-incrimination],
the common law doctrine ... is by us deemed to have its full force. In NewJersey, no
person can be compelled to be a witness against himself.")); see also, In re Martin, 90
N.J. 295, 331, 447 A.2d 1290, 1309 (1982) (stating that the privilege against self-incrimination "is firmly established as part of the common law of New Jersey and has
been incorporated into our Rules of Evidence.").
The common law privilege against self-incrimination was codified for the first
time in NewJersey in the Evidence Act of 1855. Reed, 133 N.J. at 250, 627 A.2d at 637
(citing L. 1855, c. 236, § 4). Later, this right was incorporated into the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-17 to -19 (1976) (Evid. R. 23, 24,
and 25) (bestowing the privilege against self-incrimination, setting out its boundaries,
and enumerating its exceptions). Thus, there is no question that the right against
self-incrimination exists in New Jersey despite the lack of an express constitutional
provision guaranteeing this right. Reed, 133 N.J. at 250, 627 A.2d at 637.
For further exegesis of New Jersey's state law privilege against self-incrimination,
see State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447-48, 605 A.2d 1097, 1101 (1992) (stating that the
validity of a suspect's waiver of the right against self-incrimination is judged by the
totality of the circumstances); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 134, 548 A.2d 887, 892 (1988)
(holding that the prosecution must prove the validity of a waiver beyond a reasonable
doubt); State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 267-68, 511 A.2d 80, 88 (1986) (establishing a
"'bright line'" requirement of renewed Miranda warnings once a suspect invokes his
right to remain silent); State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288, 478 A.2d 723, 728 (1984)
(holding that, to fully protect the privilege against self-incrimination, law enforcement officials must "diligently honor a defendant's request-however ambiguous-to
terminate interrogation or to have counsel present during interrogation.").
118 Reed, 133 N.J. at 251, 627 A.2d at 637. In discussing the privilege against selfincrimination, the court referred to "core" and "ancillary" rights. Id. In this context,
.core right" refers to the right against compulsory self-incrimination; whereas "ancillary rights" refers to the prophylactic rules that courts have promulgated to ensure
complete protection of the right against self-incrimination. See Hartley, 103 N.J. at
271-72, 511 A.2d at 90; see also, supra note 88 (discussing Miranda'sdemarcation of the
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dler stated that the court has "actively embraced" opportunities to
intensify the ancillary rights, often bestowing upon these ancillary
rights even greater protection than is mandated by federal law. 11 9
The justice explained that by intensifying ancillary rights such as
the right to counsel during questioning, the court dispels the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation. 12' Decreasing this coercion, the court opined, increases the likelihood
that only truly voluntary confessions are obtained, which in turn
12 1
protects the suspect's right against compelled self-incrimination.
The Reed court next examined .the rule adopted by the vast
majority of state courts that have considered this issue. 12 2 Justice
Handler reiterated that the state courts are practically unanimous
in imposing a duty upon police to inform the suspect of the attorney's presence. 2 ' Thejustice observed that these courts generally
offer one of two rationales for excluding the confession when poconstitutionally guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination and the prophylactic
rules designed to protect that privilege). Specifically, in Reed, Justice Handler explained that "[t]he privilege may be conceived as a 'cluster of rights' that collectively
give substance to the right of a person not to incriminate himself or herself under
custodial police interrogations." Reed, 133 N.J. at 251, 627 A.2d at 637.
119 Reed, 133 N.J. at 251-52, 627 A.2d at 638. The court has concluded that certain
ancillary rights are vital to the preservation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. at 251, 627 A.2d at 637. Thus, the court will often endow these ancillary rights with
even greater protection under NewJersey law than that conferred upon their federal
counterparts. Id., 627 A.2d at 638. Compare Bey, 112 N.J. at 134, 548 A.2d at 892
(1988) (holding that the state must prove the validity of a waiver beyond a reasonable
doubt) with Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (holding that the state
must prove the validity of a waiver by a preponderance of the evidence); Hartley, 103
N.J. at 256, 511 A.2d at 82 (imposing a bright-line rule holding that once a suspect
invokes his right to remain silent, police may not resume questioning without administering fresh Miranda warnings) with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)
(holding that the admissibility of confessions obtained after the suspect has exercised
his right to remain silent depends upon whether the suspect's "'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored[ ]'"); State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 115, 358 A.2d
163, 172 (1976) (concluding that a defendant is under no duty to immediately offer
to police the exculpatory story which he later gives at trial, and that a defendant may
not be penalized if he does not do so) with Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982)
(permitting the use of a defendant's post-arrest silence to impeach his trial testimony
in the absence of Miranda warnings).
120 Reed, 133 N.J. at 258-59 n.3, 627 A.2d at 641 n.3. The court noted that although
strict application of the objective standards established by Miranda's ancillary rights
will sometimes prove overinclusive, these standards constitute a vital counterweight to
the intrinsically coercive nature of custodial interrogation. Id. at 258, 627 A.2d at 641.
121 Id. at 255-57, 627 A.2d at 639-40.
122 Id. at 253-55, 627 A.2d at 639.
123 Id. at 253-54, 627 A.2d at 639. For a discussion ofjurisdictions that have considered this issue and concluded that police must inform a suspect of an attorney's presence in order for the suspect's waiver to be valid, see supra note 115.
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lice breach this duty. 124 Some courts, Justice Handler explained,
focus on the suspect's subjective waiver and hold that such a waiver
cannot be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary unless the suspect is
informed of the attorney's request to render assistance.1 25 Other
courts, the justice reported, focus on the objective unreasonableness of the actions of the police and impose the duty to inform in
1 26
an effort to discourage excessive police conduct.
Although the state courts offered differing rationales for excluding the confessions, the Reed majority discovered that these
courts were unified in a belief that preserving the privilege against
self-incrimination required counteracting the coercive atmosphere
of custodial interrogation.1 27 Because the two rationales were integrated under this supervening principle, Justice Handler concluded that choosing one of the two views was unnecessary. 1 28 In
addition, Justice Handler professed that the Reed majority was not
troubled by its inability to confidently conclude that a suspect's
awareness of an attorney's presence would enhance the suspect's
knowledge of his right to counsel. 1 29 Such a conclusion was superId. at 254, 627 A.2d at 639.
Id. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 703 P.2d 667, 672-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a suspect's waiver of the right to counsel cannot be knowing and intelligent
when police fail to inform him of an attorney's efforts to confer with him); State v.
Isom, 761 P.2d 524, 527 (Or. 1988) (concluding that unless the suspect was informed
that an attorney was present and willing to offer assistance, the suspect could not
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel during custodial interrogation).
126 Reed, 133 N.J. at 254-55, 627 A.2d at 639. See, e.g., Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170,
176 (Del. 1990) (invalidating the suspect's waiver because "[t]o hold otherwise would
be to condone 'affirmative police interference in a communication between an attorney and suspect[ ]'"); State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446, 452 (Conn. 1988) (stating"[t ] he
police may not preclude the suspect from exercising the choice to which he is constitutionally entitled. ...")
127 Reed, 133 N.J. at 255, 627 A.2d at 639-40.
128 Id., 627 A.2d at 639. The court deemed it unnecessary to "engage in an extended debate over the different approaches to dealing with the standards governing
the validity of a waiver in this context." Id. Such a debate was unnecessary, according
to the court, because all of the courts agree that "the atmosphere of custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and protecting the right against self-incrimination entails
counteracting that coercion." Id., 627 A.2d at 640. Bolstering its conclusion that
choosing one of the rationales was unnecessary, the court proceeded to weave both
rationales into one overarching supposition, stating:
[A] lthough "knowledge" is always a relevant factor in assessing the validity of a waiver of the right against self-incrimination, because the right is
against compelled self-incrimination, "knowledge" can be best understood
as a condition of "voluntariness," which itself denotes the absence of
"compulsion." Consequently, standards ostensibly imposed to enhance
a suspect's "knowledge" of the Miranda rights also counteract coercion
and assure "voluntariness."
Id. at 255-56, 627 A.2d at 640.
129 Id. at 257, 627 A.2d at 640. The court averred that proof of enhancement of the
124
125
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fluous, the justice explained, because the court was certain that
awareness of the attorney's presence would counteract the inherent coercion of custodial interrogation which, in turn, would safeguard the suspect's privilege against self-incrimination."3 '
After articulating the basis for imposing upon police a duty to
inform, the Reed majority announced the specifics of this new obligation.1 3 ' First, the court declared that the existence of an attorney-client relationship did not depend upon an explicit request for
counsel by the suspect.' 3 2 The majority explained that such a relationship exists when an attorney has been retained on the suspect's
behalf by the suspect's friends or family, or alternatively, when the
attorney had represented or was representing the suspect in other
litigation.'3 3 Following this pronouncement, the court proclaimed
that when an attorney was accessible and requested to speak with
the suspect, the police had a duty to relay that information to the
suspect before any custodial interrogation could proceed.13 4 To
ensure that police would comply with this requirement, the court
forewarned that failure to inform the suspect of the attorney's request would result in the per se invalidation of any subsequent
35
waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination by the suspect.'
Accordingly, the court declared that Reed's confession was inval36
idly obtained and therefore inadmissible against him in court.'
Justice Stein, in a separate concurring opinion, proffered a different basis for requiring police to inform suspects of an attorney's
suspect's knowledge of his right to counsel was unnecessary because mere knowledge
of the attorney's presence will "surely play an important role in 'dissipat[ing] the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and, in so doing, guard against abridgment of the suspect's' right against self-incrimination." Id. (citing Moran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986)).
130 Id. (citing Moran, 475 U.S. at 425).
131 Id. at 261-62, 627 A.2d at 643.
132 Id. at 261, 627 A.2d 643.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 261-62, 627 A.2d 643.
135 Id. at 262, 627 A.2d at 643. The court withheld judgment on whether the police's conduct violated due process. Id. at 268, 627 A.2d at 646. The court further
explained that the duty imposed was based upon the New Jersey state law privilege
against self-incrimination, and not on the right to counsel found in either the Sixth
Amendment or the New Jersey State Constitution. Id. at 263, 627 A.2d at 643-44.
Finally, the court stated that its intention in announcing this rule was to direct future
judicial scrutiny away from the subjective level of coercion experienced by the suspect
and toward objective police conduct. Id. at 267, 627 A.2d at 646.
136 Id. at 269-70, 627 A.2d at 647. The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate
division reversing Reed's murder conviction, reversed the appellate division's affirmance of Reed's aggravated criminal sexual contact conviction, and remanded the matter to the trial court. Id. at 270, 627 A.2d at 647.
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attempts to contact them. 137 Eschewing the majority's focus on objective police conduct, the justice refused to establish a bright-line
rule holding waivers invalid per se.'3 8 Focusing instead upon the
suspect's subjective waiver, Justice Stein espoused the totality of the
circumstances approach to determining whether the suspect's
waiver was made knowingly and intelligently despite his ignorance
of the attorney's request. 39 Justice Stein opined that when police
withhold the information that an attorney has been retained and
seeks to confer with a suspect, they deprive that suspect of a full
understanding of the right against self-incrimination and the consequences of abandoning it.'4 0 The justice concluded that under
such circumstances, the suspect's subsequent waiver of the privilege could not be truly "knowing" or "intelligent." 4 '
In dissent, Justice Clifford admonished the majority for focusing upon objective police conduct while minimizing the suspect's
subjective waiver. 4 2 First, the justice rejected the majority's conclusion that a mentally competent individual's right to counsel
could be invoked by a third party.' 43 Although Justice Clifford
agreed with the majority's appreciation of the importance of the
right to counsel in protecting the privilege against self-incrimination, the justice stressed that the suspect himself must make some
minimal indication of a desire to speak with an attorney before the
Id. at 270, 627 A.2d at 647 (Stein, J., concurring).
Id. at 276, 627 A.2d at 650-51 (Stein, J., concurring).
139 Id. at 276-77, 627 A.2d at 651 (SteinJ., concurring). "Preferably," Justice Stein
explained, "the Court should adhere to the settled principle that the waiver's validity
'depend[s], in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding
that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.'" Id.
(citation omitted).
140 Id. at 276, 627 A.2d at 650 (Stein,J., concurring). The justice explained that a
difference exists between informing a suspect of the general right to an attorney and
informing a suspect of the presence of a specific attorney already in the police station.
Id. at 274, 627 A.2d 649. According to Justice Stein, the suspect who is advised of
merely a general right to an attorney may decline the offer out of concern that the
police would interpret such a request as an acknowledgment of guilt. Id. If the same
suspect is instead advised that an attorney is already present, he may decide that
speaking with the attorney outweighs the risk of antagonizing his interrogators, especially if he has had prior dealings with the attorney or knows that the attorney was
retained by friends or family. Id. Thus, when such information is withheld, "the suspect's waiver of the right to counsel and to remain silent is more abstract than real,
becoming, in effect, a waiver of a theoretical right that is uninformed by the material
knowledge that retained counsel, present and available to assist the suspect in the full
exercise of his or her rights, is just outside the door." Id.
141 Id. at 277, 627 A.2d at 651 (Stein, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 279, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J. dissenting).
137
138

143
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right to counsel can attach.1 4 4 Accordingly, Justice Clifford averred
that the majority's decision "goes too far" in holding that the right
to counsel could be implicated even if a suspect explicitly and vol145
untarily waives that right.
Justice Clifford also rejected the majority's conclusion that a
suspect's ability to waive his right to counsel could be affected by
events occurring outside of the suspect's presence. 146 The justice
declared that the United States Supreme Court had correctly decided this issue in Moran.147 Consequently, Justice Clifford professed that the Reed court should adopt the reasoning of Moran and
hold that events occurring outside of a suspect's presence could
not affect the suspect's ability to understand and relinquish his
14
right to counsel. 1
The dissent further professed that the problems caused by the
majority's decision would outweigh any benefits. 149 First, Justice
Clifford denounced the majority for creating a rule that differentiates between classes of suspects and favors those more apt to have
access to legal representation. 150 Next, the dissent opined that the
Id. at 277, 282, 627 A.2d at 651, 653 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Id., 627 A.2d at 651 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
Id. at 278-79, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (quoting Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986)).
147 Id.; see Moran, 475 U.S. at 425 (holding that police have no duty under the federal constitution to inform a suspect of an attorney's attempts to contact him). See
supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of Moran.
148 Reed, 133 N.J. at 278-79, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 279-81, 627 A.2d at 652-53 (Clifford, J. dissenting).
150 Id. at 279, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford drew a distinction between suspects who are arrested in the proximity of others or who have
had prior experience with a private attorney or public defender, and suspects who are
indigent, arrested while alone, or have no previous experience with the criminal justice system. Id. The former are more likely to be the beneficiaries of a phone call to a
lawyer on their behalf, whereas the latter are "'out of the loop'" as far as legal aid is
concerned. Id. Although both suspects will be subjected to the same interrogation,
only the former will be found to have been coerced, while the latter will be deemed to
have knowingly waived the right to counsel. Id. Justice Clifford chided, "[s]uch intolerable incongruities result when the emphasis shifts to events entirely unrelated to the
suspect's knowledge rather than focusing on the sole person who matters in evaluating the validity of a suspect's waiver-the suspect" Id.
The majority rejected Justice Clifford's contention that the court's holding was
unfairly biased against poor defendants who are arrested while alone. Id. at 266, 627
A.2d at 645. Although the majority conceded that "[iut is probably true that such a
person will be less likely to have a lawyer contacted to see him or her[,]" the majority
countered by remarking that "[i]n an ideal world, every defendant would have the
family, friends, financial means, time, energy, and personal resources to mount the
best defense. But we do not live in an ideal world." Id. The majority further observed
that the court has never accepted "a disparity in the actual ability of differently-situated defendants to make use of a right as an argument against affording that right."
Id. at 267, 627 A.2d at 645-46. Consequently, the majority concluded that "the fact
144
145
146

384

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:353

court's decision would increase rather than alleviate police coer-

cion during interrogation by causing police to intensify their efforts to obtain a confession before a suspect's attorney can
arrive. 51 Finally, the justice lamented that the court would be
a multitude of new issues as a result of the majorforced to resolve
1 52
ity's holding.
Justice Clifford averred that the majority's stated purpose of
enhancing the reliability of confessions by reducing the inherent
coercion of custodial interrogation could be adequately protected
by careful administration of, and compliance with, the Miranda
rights. 153 Applying the rules set forth in Miranda, the justice prothat not every suspect will benefit from the rule we announce today is no reason to
deny the benefits of that rule to those suspects who may be advantaged by it." Id., 627
A.2d at 646.
151 Id. at 280, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford speculated:
Police officers of flexible rectitude who know that the right to question
a suspect may terminate once an attorney makes known his or her availability to assist a suspect may be tempted to 'turn up the heat' to secure
a confession in what the officers may perceive as a limited window of
opportunity.
Id. The majority countered that the only "window of opportunity" currently open for
the incentive to elicit an involuntary confession is the period of time between the
police gaining awareness of the attorney's presence and the instant when a confession
is ultimately extracted. Id. at 257, 627 A.2d at 641. The majority then professed that
its holding "closes and locks that window." Id. at 258, 627 A.2d at 641.
152 Id. at 280-81, 627 A.2d at 652-53 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justice Clifford anticipated that as a result of the majority's decision, the court would have to resolve the
following issues:
[H]ow quickly must the police relay the information that an attorney is
available? If an attorney calls the police station, is the officer receiving
the call obliged immediately to put aside all other matters and race to
inform the investigating officers? Does the right attach at the time of
communication or at some reasonable time thereafter? If the suspect
should blurt out a confession a moment before an officer seeking to
impart the availability of counsel enters the room, does the statement
become retroactively involuntary even though the police have made
every effort to honor a defendant's rights?...
*.. [W] hat duty do police officers have to provide full and accurate
information concerning the attorney's identity? ...
* * * Is an attorney "immediately available" in any circumstance
other than one in which the attorney can at that vey moment proceed to
the scene of the interrogation or speak with a defendant? What if an
attorney calls to profess availability and thereafter does not appear for
several hours? Must the attorney retained communicate with the police,
or may another person at a firm or the person who has arranged for the
attorney alert the police of the attorney's availability?
Id. The majority dismissed Justice Clifford's predictions, remarking that "[v] irtually
any rule is susceptible to a parade of hypothetical inquiries." Id. at 266, 627 A.2d at
645.
153 Id. at 282, 627 A.2d at 653 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
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claimed that the police were under no duty to inform Reed of the
attorney's request to speak with him because Reed had made no
indication of a desire to speak with an attorney.1 54 Therefore, Jusand
tice Clifford concluded, Reed's rights had not been violated
1 55
his confession should be admitted into evidence on retrial.
Reed presented the New Jersey Supreme Court with an opportunity to strengthen one of the ancillary rights to the privilege
against self-incrimination: namely, the right of a suspect to have an
attorney present during custodial interrogation.1 56 Adhering to
the court's prior jurisprudence, the majority seized this opportunity by once again going further than required by federal law to
impose a new duty upon police.1 57 The majority's stated purpose
for imposing this duty was to reduce the coercive atmosphere of
custodial interrogation. 158 While the majority's desire to dispel cothe court's deciercion is indeed admirable, it is unclear whether
1 59
sion will advance or inhibit this aspiration.
Although the majority claims otherwise,"' it is unlikely that
requiring police to notify a suspect of an attorney's availability will
greatly diminish the temptation on police to pressure that suspect
into confessing before the attorney arrives. Regardless of the obstacles that courts place in their path, police will continually attempt to extract confessions from suspects.1 6 1 As the dissent
recognized, the more logical and probable result of the majority's
decision is that the police will increase the pressure on the suspect

Id. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of Miranda.
Id., 627 A.2d at 653-54 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
See id. at 251-52, 627 A.2d 637-38.
Id. at 261-62, 627 A.2d at 643. See supra note 119 and accompanying text
(enumerating circumstances where the New Jersey Supreme Court has mandated
stricter requirements then those dictated by the United States Supreme Court).
158 See id. at 260, 627 A.2d at 642. Justice Handler stated "it is essential that every
reasonable effort be made to overcome the inherent coercive pressures of custodial
interrogation." Id.
159 See supra note 151 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Clifford's
assertion that the majority's decision is more likely to encourage rather than restrain
coercion.
160 See Reed, 133 N.J. at 257, 627 A.2d at 640 (professing that requiring police to
notify suspects of an attorney's presence will greatly diminish the temptation on police to pressure a suspect into confessing before an attorney acquires access to that
suspect).
161 See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 9, § 6.1 at 291 (stating that "'[manycriminal
cases, even when investigated by the best qualified police departments, are capable of
solution only by means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual
... .'") (quotation omitted).
154

155
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157
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from the moment of arrest in an attempt to "beat the clock." 162
Alternatively, police may simply arrest defendants while they are
alone as a means of circumventing the court's decision. With no
family or friends present to contact an attorney on the suspect's
behalf, the police need only concern themselves with a request for
counsel from one person-the suspect himself.
The fact that the majority's holding may exacerbate the very
situation that it is intended to rectify is not the only flaw in Reed.
Additionally, it is difficult to accept the proposition that the validity
of a suspect's waiver of rights can hinge upon the conduct of a
third party. 163 To better illustrate the illogicality of this premise,
envision two suspects arrested for the same crime. Both suspects
are advised of their rights, both are subjected to the same interrogation, and both elect to waive their rights and confess. In the
meantime, a relative of only one of the defendants phones an attorney, and the police fail to inform that defendant of the availability
of that attorney. Can the court logically maintain that the suspects'
subjective waivers were any different? It is irrational to find one
suspect's waiver valid and the other's invalid when the only difference between the two is that one suspect had the good fortune of
having a relative phone an attorney on his behalf.'6 4
For almost thirty years, police interrogation has been governed by the rules promulgated in Miranda v. Arizona.'6 5 The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda strikes an appropriate balance between the suspect's right against self-incrimination and society's legitimate interest in the enforcement of its
162 Reed, 133 N.J. at 280, 627 A.2d at 652 (1993) (Clifford,J., dissenting). In dissent,
Justice Clifford opined:
[T]he rule the Court fashions today risks increasing the likelihood of
police coercion. Police officers of flexible rectitude who know that the
right to question a suspect may terminate once an attorney makes
known his or her availability to assist a suspect may be tempted to "turn
up the heat" to secure a confession in what the officers may perceive as
a limited window of opportunity. The right the Court creates intensifies
rather than diminishes the pressure on law-enforcement officers to cut
corners in the effort to extract an incriminating statement.
Id.
163 See id. at 261, 627 A.2d at 643 (holding that an attorney-client relationship will
be deemed to exist when the suspect's family or friends retain an attorney on the
suspect's behalf).
164 In dissent, Justice Clifford opined that "intolerable incongruities" result from a
rule that creates two classes of suspects. Id. at 279, 627 A.2d at 652 (Clifford, J.,
dissenting).
165 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see NisSMAN, supra note 52, at § 1:13 (noting that the
United States Supreme Court revolutionized confessions law in 1966 with the Miranda
decision).
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laws. As demonstrated by the endurance of the decision, the Miranda warnings adequately and effectively apprise suspects of their
constitutional rights. The Miranda Court permitted suspects to
waive their constitutionally guaranteed rights, 166 and if a suspect
imprudently elects to do so, the New Jersey Supreme Court should
not spare 6 7him from the consequences of his own poor
1
judgment.
In recent history, the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to hold a defendant's hand as he traverses the
minefield of the criminal justice system.' 68 With Reed, however, the
court has gone one step further and now demonstrates that it is
willing to carry a defendant over every potential hazard. Only time
will tell if the court's maternal instincts will benefit the criminal
justice system and society as a whole.
W Brian Stack

166 Miranda,384 U.S. at 475-76. See supranotes 90-93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Miranda'swaiver provisions.
167 As the New Jersey Supreme Court itself has stated, a defendant's waiver is not
invalid simply because it is unwise, and the constitution is not "'offended when a
guilty man stubs his toe.'" State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 449, 605 A.2d 1097, 1102
(1992) (quoting State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52, 243 A.2d 240, 250 (1968)).
168 See supra note 119 and accompanying text (outlining instances where the New
Jersey Supreme Court has gone further than required by federal law to protect the
rights of the accused).

